About Innovate Finance

Innovate Finance is the independent industry body that represents and advances the global FinTech community in the UK. Innovate Finance’s mission is to accelerate the UK's leading role in the financial services sector by directly supporting the next generation of technology-led innovators.

The UK FinTech sector encompasses businesses from seed-stage start-ups to global financial institutions, illustrating the change that is occurring across the financial services industry. Since its inception in the era following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, FinTech has been synonymous with delivering transparency, innovation and inclusivity to financial services. As well as creating new businesses and new jobs, it has fundamentally changed the way in which consumers and businesses are able to access finance.

Introduction

Innovate Finance welcomes the opportunity to respond to HM Treasury’s (HMT) consultation on reform of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA).

The FinTech community is encouraged by the Government’s commitment to ensuring the UK remains a world-leading financial services centre and the best place to start and scale a FinTech business. We have seen this commitment evidenced throughout the implementation of the Taskforce on Innovation, Growth and Regulatory Reform (TIGGR)¹ and the Kalifa Review² recommendations, and the launch of the Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review³, which seeks to ensure the UK’s regulatory framework is agile, coherent and internationally competitive.

Set against this backdrop, holistic reform of the CCA presents a unique opportunity to thoughtfully recast and replace outdated legislation with proportionate and outcomes-based regulatory rules in the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook, ensuring the UK’s framework for consumer credit is fit for purpose and fit for the future. This will promote innovation and competition in the consumer credit market that delivers benefits to UK consumers and businesses.

While we recognise that there is a need for a holistic and thoughtful approach to reform of the CCA, we consider that the introduction of the FCA’s new Consumer Duty this year and the forthcoming Buy-Now, Pay-Later (BNPL) legal and regulatory framework justifies the need for an accelerated timeline to prioritise CCA reform by Government. This is especially important given that HMT has indicated that much needed changes to the CCA regime that could deliver good customer outcomes under the new BNPL regulatory framework cannot take place until CCA reform is finalised.

In particular, we are disappointed that HMT has chosen not to amend or dis-apply the problematic CCA and FCA Handbook derived requirements, particularly notice of sums in arrears (NOSIAs) but also the provision of paper Default Notices and other documentary requirements like annual statements, especially given their incompatibility with BNPL products and services. Our members consider this to be a missed opportunity to put good consumer outcomes at the forefront of all business decisions, at odds with the FCA’s new Consumer Duty obligations. As a result, vulnerable customers will still find themselves in situations where they receive inconsistent and confusing communications from their lenders, which could lead to worse outcomes in the longer term. We recommend that HMT reconsiders its decision not to disapply or amend these post-contractual notice measures in the CCA for the new BNPL regulatory regime. This would allow firms to develop innovative tools and services that are designed to deliver the right information to the consumer, at the right time, and in a format that is tailored to their circumstances. An approach on this basis would also ensure alignment with the new Consumer Duty for regulated firms, which is designed to deliver similar outcomes for consumers in terms of understanding and accessibility.

In preparing this response, we have engaged with a large cross-section of our membership base, including challenger banks, other specialist lenders that support small and medium sized enterprises (SME), and BNPL providers.

We would be pleased to discuss this response in more detail with HMT colleagues and / or facilitate a roundtable discussion with our members and the wider FinTech ecosystem.

Questions and responses

Do you agree with these proposed principles, and do you have views about tensions between them or relative prioritisations?

Innovate Finance strongly supports HMT’s overall objective and five guiding principles underpinning CCA reform. We have no views as to prioritisation.

Noting the governments' Net-Zero targets, how can CCA reform remove barriers that may otherwise prevent lenders from being able to offer financing for renewable energy solutions, such as electric vehicles and green home improvements?

No response.

Are there any existing definitions or concepts in the CCA which should be updated and clarified when moved to FCA rules?

Innovation in the consumer credit market — with offerings such as BNPL — has slowly eroded the clear boundaries between fixed sum and running account credit. FinTechs are now offering lending products at retailers’ digital checkouts, which combine credit lines with instalment plans. And we have observed an uptick in traditional credit providers, for example the major credit card issuers, offering new instalment plans to compete with FinTech offerings.

Each category of credit — i.e. fixed sum or running account — has differing legal and regulatory requirements that apply to the credit agreement document, post-contractual disclosures, and conduct and business rules. See, for example, the different requirements for statements relating to fixed sum credit (s. 77A CCA) versus statements relating to running account credit (s. 78(4) CCA). Firms’ failure to comply with fixed sum credit requirements under s. 77A means that they cannot, for example, charge interest on any sums due during the period of non-compliance; firms do not face the same consequences for non-compliance with running account credit requirements under s. 78. These differences could lead to arbitrage and perverse outcomes with some firms that do not neatly fit within either category opting for the categorisation that gives rise to the least onerous obligations and penalties for non-compliance with requirements.

Given the breakdown of the distinction, and bearing in mind HMT’s guiding principles of simplification and future-proofing, policymakers may wish to reconsider the utility of maintaining the distinction. Our members consider that a move to a proportionate and outcomes-based approach in the FCA Handbook would remove the need for the distinction between fixed sum and running account credit and mitigate the risk of unintended consequences for businesses and consumers.

HMT may also wish to revisit the definition of Debtor-Creditor Supplier (DCS) agreements in the Act to ensure that there is consistency and good consumer outcomes. The DCS definition gives rise to a BNPL agreement and also provides access to rights like s. 75.

Structurally, the DCS definition creates inconsistent outcomes. For example, if a customer makes a payment through an e-money provider or makes a purchase from an online marketplace then this will typically be a "four party" agreement and beyond the scope of a DCS agreement. Customers typically do not understand this and may have no idea how a payment is being made (e.g. they use a card reader and do not know that they are technically purchasing through an e-money structure). The DCS definition should be reviewed to ensure that it supports consistent consumer protections and outcomes.

Are there concepts in the CCA which are not currently defined but which should be?

In terms of definitions, we would welcome greater clarity in relation to terms such as “enforceable”. This term has not been defined, which leaves firms having to navigate a body of case law to glean the possible meaning of this term in different contexts⁴.

Additionally, we recognise that HMT is consulting in parallel on its approach to legislation that would lay the regulatory framework for the BNPL sector. We understand that the FCA will then consult on its approach. With this in mind, we would urge the FCA to adapt Consumer Credit sourcebook (CONC) rules to draw a distinction between BNPL and other forms of credit.

Do you believe the business lending scope of the CCA should be changed?

The position on the business lending exemption has resulted in a lack of competition and innovation for sole traders with lending below £25k. Many of our members have limited the launch and design of products accordingly in order to avoid the complexities of a "split book" and the associated costs of compliance, systems and processes.

We are aware that more broadly this has restricted the range of products available to sole traders, at a time when high street banks appear unable or unwilling to support lending to SMEs.

With this in mind, HMT may wish to consider aligning the definition of business lending to the level of sophistication and trading activities of the business. Value-added tax (VAT) registration thresholds could be a useful guide in this regard.

In that scenario, business loans to sole traders who are below the VAT registration threshold and who are not registered for VAT, would remain regulated under recast CCA provisions and those who are above will be exempt.

Do you support the conclusion of the Retained Provisions Report that most Information Requirements could be replaced by FCA rules without adversely affecting the appropriate degree of consumer protection, and that it is desirable to do so? Are there any additional factors the government should consider given the context changes since the report's publication in 2019?

We strongly support the conclusion of the FCA’s Retained Provisions Report. Information requirements in the CCA should be replaced urgently with FCA rules to improve consumer outcomes.

Fairer Finance’s research and report⁵ entitled Improving disclosure in the consumer credit market found that prescriptive rules setting out what firms must tell their customers are often inhibitors to customer understanding, rather than enablers. A key conclusion of the report is that:

“All disclosure rules should be removed from the Consumer Credit Act – with powers delegated to the FCA to set and amend regulations going forward. [...] rules around information requirements can and should be transferred entirely into FCA hands.”

Since the FCA’s Retained Provisions Report in 2019, the pandemic has driven a marked uptick in retail consumers accessing financial products and services through digital channels. We have also seen the increasing growth of new innovations in consumer credit — such as BNPL which is soon to be brought within the regulatory perimeter. Applying the prescriptive CCA information disclosure requirements to new innovations like BNPL does not work well for consumers — the prescribed content and form of the communications are either irrelevant to how BNPL works in practice and/or disproportionate given these products are short-term and interest-free.

With this in mind, as CCA information disclosure requirements are replaced by FCA rules, the guiding principles should be to make the information disclosures readily accessible and inclusive for all consumers, including for example those with vision loss or neurodivergence. Fairer Finance’s research showed that alternatives to traditional information disclosure that would boost consumer understanding could include videos and infographics with better signposting to key information.

Additionally, following the publication of the 2019 report, the UK Government has committed to ambitious Net Zero targets. HMT may wish to consider information disclosure from an Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) perspective to understand the practical benefit of delivering statements, notices and other documents in paper forms (particularly to problematic populations like “gone away” or deceased customers), while also seeking to ensure this option is available to those who truly need and/or want it.

In what circumstances is it important that the form, content and timing of pre-contractual and post-contractual information provided to consumers is mandated and prescribed? What are the risks to providing lenders more flexibility in this area?

There is a need for HMT to entirely reconsider the form, content and timing of pre- and post-contractual information provided to consumers in order to drive positive outcomes. Currently, the information that is presented is lengthy and duplicative – and the mandated forms of presentation drives consumer disengagement and poor outcomes.

Our members consider that rules contained within FCA’s CONC, Principles for Businesses (PRIN) (including the high level principle to ‘treat customers fairly’), and the new Consumer Duty for regulated firms, all offer adequate regulatory provision to achieve the overarching aim of ensuring that customers receive the right information at the right time, in language that is easy to understand and that allows them to make informed decisions.

HMT has itself acknowledged⁶ that the BNPL sector developed new methods of consumer communications (outside of the scope of the CCA and regulatory perimeter), which are clear, timely and relevant. This provides a compelling blueprint for industry to evolve its communications to be less prescriptive, more consumer-centric and more outcomes-focused.

We recommend that the long-term, target model is that the form, content and timing of pre- and post-contractual information is tailored to individual consumers’ needs. In the interim, in order to work towards this goal, we support the recommendations in the Fairer Finance report that:

All lending products should have to produce a summary box, which must be made available before the start of the application process, and throughout the journey. Through testing of a mocked-up consumer journey, it was proven that consumers want a short summary of the product which is more accessible and digestible than full terms and conditions. The FCA should prescribe what information should be disclosed in these — and the requirements should be adapted to each sector. The language and format of the summaries should not be prescribed, however, allowing firms to innovate in the way they communicate and improve customer understanding.

The FCA should introduce a new ‘prominence’ requirement across all financial services communications, requiring firms to prominently draw any onerous or misunderstood product features to the customer’s attention during the application process. In the credit market, guidance should make it clear that this needs to include details around the consequences of missing payments, early repayment charges — and how interest, fees and charges are applied.

The calculation of Annual Percentage Rate (APR) should be standardised and greater flexibility should be provided to short-term lenders in terms of how they show the cost of credit. Consumer testing showed that APR is not always a useful way to compare the cost of credit. By adding annual fees, it can distort the number, while displaying an annual cost can be misleading in the context of shorter-term forms of credit.

The Consumer Understanding outcome in the Consumer Duty posits that consumers should be given the information they need, at the right time, and presented in a way they can understand it. Does the implementation of this section, and the Consumer Duty more broadly, go some way to substitute the need for prescription in CCA information requirements?

The recommendations in response to question seven, along with the overlay of the FCA’s outcome-focused Consumer Duty eliminates the need for additional prescriptive rules based on the CCA information disclosures to be transposed to the FCA Handbook.

Fairer Finance’s evidence shows that prescriptive rules regarding timing and form and content of information disclosure does not lead to good consumer outcomes.

For example, the CCA and FCA Handbook requirements relating to NOSIA rules could undermine the consumer understanding outcome. The NOSIA rules require lenders to send a letter where consumers fall two or more payments behind on their loans. Lenders must also issue subsequent notice of sums in arrears (SNOSIA) every six months after the initial NOSIA, until consumers are up to date with their repayments. The wording of the NOSIA and SNOSIA is prescribed by law.

Lenders are required to send these notices even where consumers have entered into an agreed forbearance arrangement. For consumers with an agreed forbearance arrangement with their lender, particularly those consumers with characteristics of vulnerability, the receipt of SNOSIAs can cause unnecessary confusion and distress — ultimately giving rise to poor consumer outcomes.

In our response to the FCA’s consultation on the Consumer Duty, we urged the regulator to provide further guidance on ‘what good looks like’ for firms as they balance the need to meet prescriptive regulatory and/or legislative requirements and consumer understanding outcomes.

We also recommended a thorough, post-Brexit review of FCA retail consumer regulation to identify existing prescriptive rules which could be removed when the Consumer Duty is introduced. This review has not taken place, and therefore we could find further examples where the Consumer Duty sits awkwardly with prescriptive rules and legislation and undermines good consumer outcomes.

We consider that the move to a holistic outcomes-based approach (where that does not sit on top of duplicative or conflicting prescriptive rules and regulations) should give firms the flexibility to continuously innovate on the optimal way to display information so it achieves the best outcomes for consumers.

However, It will be necessary for the FCA to share with industry the benchmark metrics that it will use to assess good consumer outcomes and inform enforcement activity – e.g. volume of defaults, complaints, etc.

Given the increasing use of smartphones and other mobile devices to take out credit products, how can consumer information be delivered on devices in a way that sufficiently engages consumers whilst ensuring they receive all necessary information?

As noted in response to questions six and seven, Fairer Finance has shown that consumer understanding would be increased through innovative approaches to information sharing by firms — such as impartial, factual videos that summarise the benefits and downsides of a lending product, infographics, and better signposting to key information. These methods of information sharing would be well-suited to mobile-based digital channels.

We consider that an outcomes-focused approach will unlock further innovative approaches as firms test, learn and iterate on their methods of information sharing. Firms will be able to better tailor the form and content to suit the distribution channel and consumer characteristics.

Are there any areas where, in your view, consumer protection legislation, rules and/or guidance, outside of the CCA, makes for appropriate levels of consumer protections and mirrors or replicates the effects of the provisions in the CCA?

We consider that the FCA’s Consumer Duty raises the bar and puts an onus on firms to evidence good consumer outcomes compared to the provisions in the CCA, which have been shown to lead to ‘tick-box’ compliance and poor consumer outcomes (see our example in relation to NOSIAs in response to question eight).

We recognise that there may be some legislative elements of the CCA — primarily section 75 protection — that will need to remain in legislative form, or be thoughtfully recast in the FCA Handbook.

If other consumer protection legislation, rules and/or guidance, outside of the CCA, falls short of replicating the effect of the provisions in the CCA, where do these gaps exist and how significant are they?

We consider the FCA has a breadth of tools, including enforcement powers, available if it needs to intervene in a market, and this regulatory toolkit has provided appropriate consumer protection for other regulated products and sectors without the need to rely on legislative protections. This toolkit will be further enhanced when the FCA’s new Consumer Duty goes live later this year.

We acknowledge that s. 75 cannot be easily recast as an FCA rule, given it imposes statutory liability on an issuer. We do, however, note that the application of s. 75 as mentioned above (in response to question three) is inconsistent in delivering consumer protections, particularly in e-commerce contexts.

The FCA’s Consumer Duty mandates a consumer support outcome. How does the Consumer Duty interact with the rights and protections provided to consumers in the specific consumer credit regulatory regime, which currently consists of the CCA and FCA rules?

Our view is that outcomes-based regulation should not be superimposed on top of prescriptive, conflicting rules — see our response to question eight for examples where the Consumer Duty does not sit well with existing CCA and FCA rules.

In relation to the consumer support outcome, our members consider that this aligns with the guidance on the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers and existing expectations in the FCA’s PRIN section of the Handbook. For example, the FCA states that in order to achieve good outcomes for vulnerable consumers, firms should take action to:

Understand the needs of their target market/customer base;
Make sure staff have the right skills and capability to recognise and respond to the needs of vulnerable customers;
Respond to customer needs throughout product design, flexible customer service provision and communications; and
Monitor and assess whether they are meeting and responding to the needs of customers with characteristics of vulnerability, and make improvements where this is not happening.

We know that consumers are looking for more engagement and support from their lenders, as shown in the Finance and Leasing Association’s (FLA) report⁷ on the future of credit. Many of our members have taken proactive steps to offer a variety of customer support. For example, many of our members offered forbearance agreements during the Covid-19 pandemic, before it was mandated by the FCA. Some of our members are also trialling new information sharing, such as sending reminders of upcoming payments in advance to allow consumers time to manage their money in order to make payment or to defer payment (‘snooze’) if they need more time.

If it is possible to amend the FCA’s FSMA rule-making power to enable FCA rules to replicate the effect of rights and protections currently in the CCA, what is your view on the risks and benefits of doing this?

We consider that Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) rule-making powers should be amended to replicate rights and protections in a wider range of circumstances than currently under the CCA.

This is in line with the Government’s stated objective of repealing and replacing EU-derived financial services legislation (such as the CCA) with a comprehensive FSMA model that is tailored to the UK⁸. Under a FSMA-based model, the FCA can determine the most appropriate regulatory requirements for the consumer credit sector.

Having regulatory requirements in legislation means it is difficult and time-consuming to update, and it places resourcing and other pressures on Parliament which is asked to review a significant volume of highly-technical provisions.

Under the Future Regulatory Framework review, the FCA and other regulators’ rule making will be subject to scrutiny, to act as a check and balance on any new regulatory requirements that they introduce via any extended FSMA-rule making powers.

Are there any rights and protections provisions which you feel should not be moved to FCA rules and should remain in legislation? Please provide an explanation of why you hold these views.

Please see our response to question thirteen.

Given this, to what extent do time orders provide additional protections to these rules and guidance? What evidence are you aware of that the existence of this right changes firm behaviour and improves consumer outcomes?

We consider that firms acting responsibly and in line with the new Consumer Duty requirements should reduce the need for consumers to apply to the court to request more time to pay a credit agreement where they have fallen behind on payments. The FCA may also wish to consider the merits of recasting analogous protections to time orders, where appropriate, in CONC 7 rules.

What is your view on the usefulness of the right to voluntary termination and its role in protecting consumers? Are there improvements that could be made to the functioning of this right?

We note at the HMT-led roundtables last summer, other trade associations and consumer groups flagged up that voluntary termination was often subject to abuse by consumers in the context of motor vehicle finance. Our members do not have any additional evidence to share.

To what extent do the FSMA and FOS regimes make the unfair relationship provisions unnecessary? If these provisions are to be kept in legislation, with other rights and protections moving to FCA rules, does this create more complexity and confusion for lenders and borrowers and what will the effect on innovation in the sector be?

We consider that the FSMA and Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) regimes make the unfair relationship provisions in legislation unnecessary. The protections can be replicated by FCA rules (e.g. guidance on treating customers fairly, PRIN and the Consumer Duty) and made more clear, and consumers have recourse to the FOS if they have issues with their creditors.

In terms of lack of clarity, section 140 of the CCA applies a broad test of fairness to each particular creditor / debtor relationship, and the Act confers wide discretionary powers on the court. In Plevin ⁹, the court noted that the CCA was deliberately framed in very wide terms and with little guidance about the criteria for its application, so that it was not possible to state a precise or universal test for the application of s. 140A CCA (and other parts of s.140). This is unhelpful for consumers and businesses.

Further, during the HMT roundtables last summer, all of the trade associations and law firms in attendance flagged up the claims management company cottage industry that had mushroomed in connection with s. 140 CCA — primarily due to the ambiguity described above.

Would you be supportive of HM Treasury exploring the option of amending FSMA rule-making powers in such a way to enable unenforceability to apply to breaches of FCA rules in a similar manner to how unenforceability applies under the CCA, noting there would not be a role for court action in this scenario?

Innovate Finance considers that the FCA has sufficient tools to manage firms and provide better targeted remediation of consumer detriment. CCA-based sanctions were intended to stand alone, and not to be overlaid with FCA and FOS regimes which have the ability to provide appropriate redress for consumers.

The automatic application of CCA sanctions for minor technical infringements that do not drive detriment is a risk for the consumer credit industry, increases barriers to entry and stifles innovation. While we are not opposed to the FCA having these sanctions as part of their toolkit, how these sanctions apply currently needs to be considered and should be reserved for cases of wilful or negligent breach which leads to customer detriment.

There needs to be consideration that the legal sanctions apply automatically if there is a technical or minor contravention of requirements. In many cases, this provides customers with a windfall (e.g. where interest or fees are disentitled) in the absence of detriment. Unenforceability is also misunderstood and — in many cases — does not provide better protection than existing FCA remedies and powers.

Having such draconian controls is seen as promoting "self-policing" but also creates significant barriers to entry for FinTechs. The risk of contravention leads to high compliance and controls costs, without furthering consumer protection aims or supporting good customer outcomes.

The FCA rules approach is designed to be more flexible and adapt to ongoing positions. Having less prescriptive rules will lead to more ambiguity and firms needing to make judgements on how they meet requirements. There is also a possibility for the FCA's tolerances to adjust. Coupling this with automatic sanctions would further increase compliance costs and does not balance customer protection with proportionate regulation, particularly for new entrants.

Housing all of the requirements — to the greatest extent possible — in flexible FCA rules allows for a clearer regulatory system that can better support innovation and can adapt easily to new trends and structures to support consumers appropriately.

Do you agree that the government should consider the proportionality of sanctions and ensure that they are relative to the consumer harm caused/potentially caused?

The proportionality of sanctions is long overdue for a review. The sanctions of unenforceability and disentitlement, for example, are “self-policing” in nature and apply automatically without the FCA or consumer taking any action. This has resulted in instances of unenforceability and disentitlement for minor breaches of information requirements where there has been no evidence of consumer harm.

As such, the Government should consider the proportionality and appropriateness of sanctions to ensure that they are relative to harm caused.

What types of breaches of CCA rules do you think that sanctions should attach themselves to and why? For example, should the disentitlement sanction be limited to the small sub-set of cases giving rise to unenforceability, where there is the greatest risk of harm?

The FCA has appropriate tools to see redress be made to customers who have suffered detriment. These sanctions should attach to wilful or negligent breaches of the requirements which have caused actual harm, and lesser breaches should be managed by firms and the FCA in accordance with a wider toolkit.

How valuable are the CCA provisions that give rise to a criminal offence? (See Annex 2 for list of CCA provisions that give rise to criminal offences)

We agree with the conclusions of the FCA’s Retained Provisions Review (2019) that the criminal offences in the CCA are no longer required in light of the FSMA regulatory toolkit. The FCA’s report also notes that there is no evidence of prosecutions being made under these provisions, or consumers using these provisions to hold lenders to account.

Are there any provisions that are outdated because the practices they pertain to are not used anymore, or would removing some CCA provisions lead to the return of these practices?

No response.

What is your view on the merits in increasing the standards of conduct for consumer hire agreements to make them comparable to those for consumer credit?

No response.

Should the section 17 provisions which enable exemptions from specific elements of the CCA and CONC continue to exist? What would be the impact of these provisions not applying?

It is important that there is a level playing field between consumer credit providers. We note that the Government intends to disapply the s. 17 exemptions for BNPL agreements (when they become regulated), as many BNPL agreements are under the current £50 threshold.

The small agreements exemption in the CCA has long been regarded as an anomaly. In light of the Consumer Duty and other requirements on firms, it may make more sense to remove this exemption, in the interests of consistency and consumer protection.

How can this reform ensure that firms provide information to consumers which is accessible for a wide range of financial literacy and numeracy levels?

Please refer to our response to question seven, which outlines some examples of what good could look like.

In what ways should this reform ensure that consumers’ mental health and wellbeing is supported throughout the consumer credit product lifecycle?

The industry and FCA's approach to consumers' wellbeing had advanced significantly over the past decade (see for example the guidance around the treatment of vulnerable customers).

To take one example, the prescriptive CCA requirements in relation to form, content and timing of post-contractual disclosures are overly technical, which often results in unintended outcomes such as consumer distress and misunderstanding (see above for our examples on NOSIAs).

Allowing firms sufficient flexibility to adapt these notices to suit a more modern tone and address different vulnerabilities is critical in supporting good consumer outcomes.

What are the key considerations that the government needs to take into account when reforming the CCA to ensure that Sharia compliant loans can be expressly accommodated? Which areas of the CCA are not currently compatible with Islamic Finance, and how could they be amended to accommodate Sharia compliant loans?

No response.

If interest rates are prohibited for Islamic Finance products, how does the government ensure that Islamic finance and non-Islamic finance products can be easily compared, given that APR values are used for comparative purposes?

No response.

Are you aware of any implications of our policy approach on people with protected characteristics?

No response.

Do you have any views on how the government can mitigate any disproportionate impacts on protected characteristics?

No response.

[ENDS]

1 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/994125/FINAL_TIGRR_REPORT__1_.pdf
2 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/978396/KalifaReviewofUKFintech01.pdf
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/future-regulatory-framework-frf-review-proposals-for-reform
4 Phillip McGuffick v The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm) (06 October 2009). In this case the court held that “enforceable” can mean different things in the context of different CCA provisions.
5 https://www.fairerfinance.com/assets/uploads/images/producttypes/Credit-market-disclosure-March-2023.pdf
6 Regulation of Buy-Now Pay-later: Consultation on draft legislation, February 2023
7 https://www.fla.org.uk/media/news/the-future-of-credit--finding-out-what-consumers-want/
8 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-a-smarter-financial-services-framework-for-the-uk
9 [2014] UKSC 61